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The cost‐effectiveness acceptability curve (CEAC) shows the probability that an
option ranks first for net benefit. Where more than two options are under con-
sideration, the CEAC offers only a partial picture of the decision uncertainty.
This paper discusses the appropriateness of showing the full set of rank prob-
abilities for reporting the results of economic evaluation in multiple technology
appraisal (MTA). A case study is used to illustrate the calculation of rank prob-
abilities and associated metrics, based on Monte Carlo simulations from a deci-
sion model. Rank probabilities are often used to show uncertainty in the results
of network meta‐analysis, but until now have not been used for economic eval-
uation. They may be useful decision‐making tools to complement the CEAC in
specific MTA contexts.
KEYWORDS
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rank probabilities1 | INTRODUCTION
Standard decision rules for economic evaluation calculate incremental cost‐effectiveness ratios (ICER), excluding dom-
inated and extendedly dominated options. Uncertainty is shown using the cost‐effectiveness acceptability curve (CEAC).
These decision rules assume that only one option (that with the greatest mean net benefit) will be chosen by the deci-
sion maker, and all the others will be rejected. This assumption may be inappropriate for some health technology
appraisal (HTA) settings where multiple options are compared. Although an individual patient can only be given one
option, there may be specific circumstances where the decision maker does not wish to recommend only one option
for the entire patient population, for example, where the policy maker wants to encourage competition, or aims to diver-
sify risk.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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802 EPSTEINA risk neutral decision maker who had to choose between two options would prefer that with greater mean net ben-
efit, and would not be concerned by the chance that this option may give lower net benefit (Claxton, 1999). In practice,
decision makers are sometimes concerned about these risks, for example because they are not risk neutral, or because
they may want to make a provisional decision conditional on further evidence (Rothery et al., 2017). Where there are
multiple options, it may be of interest to estimate the probability that a treatment ranks second, or third, and so on. This
article deals with the situation where a choice needs to be made between a finite number of alternative therapies for a
specific patient group. However, the ranks must not be interpreted as identifying an optimal “sequence” of therapies
(first‐line, second‐line, etc.).
It is noteworthy that reporting guidelines for network meta‐analysis (NMA) state that “authors are encouraged to
report not only the probability of each intervention being best, but also a more complete presentation of rankings that
includes the probability of being at least second best, third best, etc. This provides a picture of the uncertainty associated
with the rankings” (Hutton et al., 2015). To better communicate uncertainty, authors for NMA also recommend graph-
ical tools such as rankograms (Chaimani, Higgins, Mavridis, Spyridonos, & Salanti, 2013; Hutton et al., 2015). So far,
such measures have not been used for presenting the results of economic evaluation.
Therefore, there may be circumstances where rank probabilities are useful as decision‐making tools alongside tradi-
tional metrics such as ICER and CEAC. This article shows how rank probabilities for net benefit are calculated, how
they are related to the CEAC, and discusses how decision makers might act on these. Furthermore, this article argues
that displaying the full set of rank probabilities, alongside the cost‐effectiveness plane and the CEAC, can assist commu-
nication between health economists and decision makers and help explain some well‐known paradoxes that sometimes
arise in the economic evaluation of multiple technology appraisal (MTA), such as when a dominated option can be most
likely to have the greatest net benefit.2 | METHODS2.1 | Rank probabilities
Suppose there are J mutually exclusive treatment options, and, using a probabilistic decision model, the mean costs Cj
and quality‐adjusted life years (QALYs) Qj of each option j are estimated by Monte Carlo simulation, along with mean
net benefit, NBj = λQj – Cj. The rank probability Pjr is the probability that option j takes rank r in terms of net benefit,
for j = 1..J and r = 1..J. Thus, the CEAC shows the probability Pj1. The cumulative rank probability Pcumjr is the proba-
bility that option j is up to a particular rank r.
The rank probabilities (Pj2, Pj3,.., Pjr, up to PjJ) can be easily derived (along with the CEAC) from the results of Monte
Carlo simulations, using the rank() function in Excel for example. The rank probabilities can be displayed graphically as
rankograms or cumulative rankograms (Salanti, Ades, & Ioannidis, 2011).
Guidelines for NMA also recommend summary measures such as the surface under the cumulative ranking, or
SUCRA, defined as∑J−1r¼1P
cum
jr /(J‐1) (Chaimani et al., 2013; Hutton et al., 2015). This is interpreted in the NMA literature
as the percentage of rank that each option has, compared with an ideal treatment that always ranks first without uncer-
tainty (Chaimani et al., 2013). However, as the SUCRA is an unweighted average of the cumulative rank probabilities, it
lacks any empirical or theoretical grounding (such as utility theory) for preference‐based choice. Therefore, it does not
seem an appropriate summary measure for use in economic evaluation, and this article focuses on the use of rank prob-
abilities as measures of uncertainty alongside the CEAC.2.2 | Case study
A case study is used to illustrate and motivate the discussion. The patients are people with severe symptomatic varicose
veins (National Clinical Guideline Centre, 2012). The costs and QALYs were generated by a stochastic model, available
at https://doi.org/10.17632/pmrt2gnzcr.1. There are seven therapies, labeled A–G. A is the standard interventional treat-
ment, taken as the reference or “comparator.” B is conservative care, that is, no interventional treatment, with no initial
cost. The others are competing interventional therapies. The input data to the model are stylized but are intended to be
fairly realistic (Epstein, Onida, Bootun, Ortega‐Ortega, & Davies, 2018), see Table S1.
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3.1 | ICER and CEAC
The ICER of B versus D was £ 5,857/QALY. All other options were dominated or extendedly dominated (Figure 1).
Hence, D has the greatest mean net benefit for all λ > £ 5,857/QALY. The cost‐effectiveness acceptability frontier shows,
at given λ, the probability that the option with the highest mean net benefit is the highest ranked for net benefit
(Fenwick, Claxton, & Sculpher, 2001). At λ = £20,000, D had the greatest mean net benefit and was the option with
the highest probability (54%) to have the greatest net benefit (Figure 2 and Table 1). Option C has a very low CEAC
probability at λ = £20,000 (4%), but has the second highest mean net benefit (Table 1). Option F was dominated, and
thus will never have the greatest mean net benefit at any λ (Barton, Briggs, & Fenwick, 2008) but nevertheless had a
relatively high probability (33%) of having greatest net benefit. At λ above £65,000, F was most likely to have the greatest
net benefit (Figure 2).3.2 | Rank probabilities
It is well known that an option with the greatest mean net benefit might not be that with greatest probability of highest
net benefit, and dominated or extendedly dominated options can have the greatest probability of highest net benefit
(Barton et al., 2008). Hence, superficially, the ICERs and the CEACs can present a somewhat contradictory message,
even though they are calculated from the same data. Barton et al. showed that this situation arises when multiple
options are correlated and there are differences in the level of variation of net benefit between them (Barton et al., 2008).
However, the CEAC reports a partial picture of the uncertainty. It shows the probability that option j has the greatest
net benefit, but not the variance in net benefit. Showing policy makers the full table of rank probabilities can help
explain these apparent paradoxes. Option F had a relatively high probability of being the most cost‐effective (as shown
by the CEAC), but also a relatively high probability of a low rank (which is not apparent from the CEAC). This variance
was also seen in the inter‐quartile range (IQR) of the ranks. Option F ranked first in >25% of simulations and fifth or
worse in >25% of simulations. Other therapies had a tighter IQR, indicating more certainty about their relative position.
Showing decision makers the rank probabilities allows them to observe this variation and hence, hopefully, better
understand the decision model.3.3 | Rank of treatments
If the decision maker wishes to rank treatments and is concerned both about mean net benefit and about the chance a
treatment has lower net benefit, then there may be no unambiguously “correct” order. The SUCRA is a summary mea-
sure that compares whether one option is more likely to rank higher overall than another. The SUCRA for F is 66% and
that for C is 63% at λ = £20,000/QALY (Table 1). But, this does not mean F will be or should be preferred to C. F is moreFIGURE 1 Results of the varicose veins case study: total mean cost and mean quality‐adjusted life year per person for each strategy, and
the efficiency frontier [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
TABLE 1 Rank of net benefit for each treatment for the varicose veins case study at a threshold λ of £20,000/QALY
D F C A G B E
Rank probability
(CEAC) 1 54% 33% 4% 1% 1% 7% 0%
2 33% 25% 21% 11% 7% 4% 0%
3 9% 6% 38% 31% 11% 3% 1%
4 3% 9% 23% 39% 15% 5% 7%
5 1% 9% 12% 16% 20% 13% 28%
6 0% 10% 3% 3% 16% 27% 42%
7 0% 8% 0% 0% 29% 41% 22%
Cumulative rank probability
1 54% 33% 4% 1% 1% 7% 0%
2 86% 58% 25% 12% 8% 11% 1%
3 96% 63% 63% 43% 19% 15% 2%
4 99% 72% 86% 81% 35% 19% 9%
5 100% 81% 98% 97% 55% 33% 36%
6 100% 92% 100% 100% 71% 60% 78%
7 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SUCRA 89% 66% 63% 56% 31% 24% 21%
Rank of mean net benefit 1 4 2 3 5 7 6
Mean rank 1.7 3.0 3.3 3.7 5.1 5.6 5.7
Median rank (IQR) 1 (1–2) 2 (1–5) 3 (3–4) 4 (3–4) 5 (4–7) 6 (5–7) 6 (5–6)
Note. The options have been ordered in the table from highest to lowest mean rank, calculated as∑Jr = 1(Pjr × r). The first row of percentages corresponds to the
CEAC probabilities for a threshold λ = £20000/QALY.
Abbreviations: CEAC, cost‐effectiveness acceptability curve; SUCRA, surface under the cumulative ranking; QALY, quality‐adjusted life year.
FIGURE 2 Results of the varicose veins case study: (a) cost‐effectiveness acceptability curves and (b) cost‐effectiveness acceptability
frontier [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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EPSTEIN 805likely than C to rank first or second, but equally likely to rank in the top three, and less likely to rank in the top four.
Whether F is preferred to C depends on the importance or weight the decision maker gives to each place in the rank.
Hence, unweighted aggregate measures of rank such as the SUCRA, mean rank, or median rank are unsuitable for
preference‐based choices.
First‐order stochastic dominance (FSD) can be a useful tool to place some options in order of preference, without
requiring any information about the decision maker's attitude to risk (Leshno & Levy, 2004). One option shows FSD
over another when it has a higher or equal probability of being up to any rank r, at a given threshold λ. So, for example,
Option D shows FSD over all the others (Figure 3). Hence, D should be unambiguously preferred to any other option. In
the same way, FSD can unambiguously place options D≽C≽A≽G in that order. Likewise, FSD indicates D≽F and F≽G,
but the absolute position of F could be second, third, or fourth, depending on the decision maker's attitude to risk. In the
same way, a decision maker might place B, G, and E in any order. Examination of the interquartile ranges of rank in
Table 1 shows greater variability in the ranks of F, G, and B than can be seen in other options.4 | DISCUSSION
The appropriate results to report in an economic evaluation will depend on the decision maker's objectives. Even for-
malized HTA agencies like National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) and Institute for Quality and Effi-
ciency in Health Care (IQWiG) in practice use different and often evolving paradigms depending on context. Given a
particular decision problem, what information might usefully support the decision maker?
In some MTA, the decision maker may wish to approve the option with the greatest mean net benefit and reject the
others. In this paradigm, the cost‐effectiveness plane and the CEAC would offer appropriate information, with the
CEAC indicating the degree of uncertainty about which option offered greatest net benefit (the other ranks being irrel-
evant to the decision maker). Rank probabilities would not be useful for this decision maker.
However, this “first past the post” policy is not the only possible decision‐making paradigm. It assumes the decision
maker gives no importance at all to the chance the option may be second best, third best, and so forth. In the case study,
the decision maker may welcome the knowledge that, at the given threshold λ, Option D not only offers greatest mean
net benefit, and has the highest probability of greatest net benefit (CEAC), but also has the highest probability of being
up to any rank (FSD). There may also be circumstances where the “first‐best” option identified by the analyst is ruled
out for some reason (for example, it is subsequently withdrawn from the market by the manufacturer). In such cases,
information about the second‐best option would be useful to make a decision.
Reporting the complete matrix of rank probabilities may help the decision maker understand the decision model bet-
ter, by indicating the degree of variance in the rankings. In the case study, Option F (a dominated therapy) had a high
probability of greatest rank, but also a high probability of low rank. This variance in net benefit is not revealed from the
CEAC alone. From this information, Option F might be characterized as a “promising” innovative treatment, one with a
good chance of success but also a high chance of failure.FIGURE 3 Varicose veins case study: cumulative rank probabilities (cumulative rankograms) for each option [Colour figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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mend more than one option. The fact that options are “mutually exclusive” at an individual level does not preclude
an HTA body approving reimbursement for multiple options at a population level. Manski refers to this as the ability
to “socially diversify” risks that are individually indivisible (Manski, 2018). There may be several examples. First, if
the decision maker wishes to fund a promising but uncertain treatment (such as F) to promote “learning‐by‐doing,”
as well as funding mature and cost‐effective treatments (such as D). Second, if the central HTA agency is responsible
for approving therapies onto a “positive list” for reimbursement, leaving the final choice to clinicians and patients.
Third, the HTA agency may wish to encourage competition in the health‐care market (Cole & Dusetzina, 2018; Danzon
& Chao, 2000; Guha, Lacy, & Woodhouse, 2008; Morton & Boller, 2017; United Nations, 2015). Even in tightly regulated
European pharmaceutical markets, the notified reimbursement price is often a “maximum,” and manufacturers nego-
tiate discounts with local procurement agencies. The negotiating power of local buyers may be augmented if a range of
substitutes are reimbursed. Likewise, some medical devices markets are characterized by acute competition and rapid
technological advance, and the role of a central HTA agency may be to provide information (rather than prescriptive
guidance) to local decision makers.
If the decision maker wishes to recommend r options, then it might be useful to know the probability that an option
is in the top r. For example, in the case study, the HTA agency might wish to provide information about which options
are likely to be in the top four. From Figure 3, D, F, C, and A are more likely than not to be in the top four at
λ = £20,000, and it is also noteworthy that these form a fairly tight cluster on the cost‐effectiveness plane (Figure 1).
Other therapies are more likely than not to be in the “bottom three” for net benefit at λ = £20,000, either because of
lack of effectiveness (B and E) or high costs (G). A promising area of qualitative research might be to study decision
makers' objectives and attitude to risk when faced with an MTA and whether rank probabilities are informative or use-
ful alongside conventional ways of communicating results.
NMA usually synthesizes clinical outcomes but shares many of the mathematical properties of an economic evalua-
tion (particularly, the assumption of transitivity and an interpretation that fits more naturally into a Bayesian frame-
work). Given the increasing acceptability of NMA, the use of similar presentational devices such as rank probabilities
in the evidence synthesis and economic analyses makes HTA as a whole more coherent.
To the author's knowledge, the use of rank metrics in economic evaluation has not been proposed before. It is hoped
that this paper will stimulate discussion, initiate further methodological research, and increase awareness among deci-
sion makers of their interpretation and usefulness.CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
No funding has been received and no conflict of interest is reported.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was presented at the ISPOR conference, Barcelona, Spain, 11‐14 November 2018.ORCID
David Epstein https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2275-0916REFERENCES
Barton, G. R., Briggs, A. H., & Fenwick, E. A. L. (2008). Optimal cost‐effectiveness decisions: The role of the cost‐effectiveness acceptability
curve (CEAC), the cost‐effectiveness acceptability frontier (CEAF), and the expected value of perfection information (EVPI). Value in
Health, 11(5), 886–897. https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1524‐4733.2008.00358.X
Chaimani, A., Higgins, J. P. T., Mavridis, D., Spyridonos, P., & Salanti, G. (2013). Graphical tools for network meta‐analysis in STATA. PLoS
ONE, 8(10). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0076654), e76654.
Claxton, K. (1999). The irrelevance of inference: A decision‐making approach to the stochastic evaluation of health care technologies. Journal
of Health Economics, 18(3), 341–364. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10537899. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167‐6296(98)00039‐3
Cole, A. L., & Dusetzina, S. B. (2018). Generic price competition for specialty drugs: Too little, too late? Health Affairs, 37(5), 738–742. https://
doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2017.1684
EPSTEIN 807Danzon, P. M., & Chao, L.‐W. (2000). Does regulation drive out competition in pharmaceutical markets? The Journal of Law and Economics,
43(2), 311–358. https://doi.org/10.1086/467458
Epstein, D., Onida, S., Bootun, R., Ortega‐Ortega, M., & Davies, A. H. (2018). Cost‐effectiveness of current and emerging treatments of var-
icose veins. Value in Health, 21(8), 911–920. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2018.01.012
Fenwick, E., Claxton, K., & Sculpher, M. (2001). Representing uncertainty: The role of cost‐effectivenes acceptabiliy curves. Health Econom-
ics, 10 (May, 779–787. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.635
Guha, R., Lacy, A. M., & Woodhouse, S. (2008). Analyzing competition in the pharmaceutical industry. Economics Committee Newsletter, 8(1),
1–10. https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Articles/Analyzing‐Competition‐in‐the‐Pharmaceutical‐Indust
Hutton, B., Salanti, G., Caldwell, D. M., Chaimani, A., Schmid, C. H., Cameron, C., …Moher, D. (2015). The PRISMA extension statement for
reporting of systematic reviews incorporating network meta‐analyses of health care interventions: Checklist and explanations. Annals of
Internal Medicine, 162(11), 777–784. https://doi.org/10.7326/M14‐2385
Leshno, M., & Levy, H. (2004). Stochastic dominance and medical decision making. Health Care Management Science, 7, 207–215. https://doi.
org/10.1242/dev.144097
Manski, C. F. (2018). Reasonable patient care under uncertainty. Health Economics, 27 (June, 1397–1421. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3803
Morton, Fiona Scott, and Boller Lysle T. 2017. “ENABLING COMPETITION IN PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS Hutchins center working
paper #30.” https://www.brookings.edu/wp‐content/uploads/2017/05/wp30_scottmorton_competitioninpharma1.pdf.
National Clinical Guideline Centre. 2012. “Varicose Veins in the Legs.” National Guideline. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004.
Rothery, C., Claxton, K., Palmer, S., Epstein, D., Tarricone, R., & Sculpher, M. (2017). Characterising uncertainty in the assessment of med-
ical devices and determining future research needs. Health Economics (United Kingdom), 26(S1), 109–123. https://doi.org/10.1002/
hec.3467
Salanti, G., Ades, A. E., & Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2011). Graphical methods and numerical summaries for presenting results from multiple‐
treatment meta‐analysis: An overview and tutorial. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclinepi.2010.03.016, 64,
163–171.
United Nations. 2015. “Seventh United Nations conference to review all aspects of the set of multilaterally agreed equitable principles and
rules for the control of restrictive business practices.” http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/tdrbpconf8d3_en.pdf.SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of the article.
How to cite this article: Epstein D. Beyond the cost‐effectiveness acceptability curve: The appropriateness of
rank probabilities for presenting the results of economic evaluation in multiple technology appraisal. Health
Economics. 2019;28:801–807. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3884
